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 ABSTRACT:  This paper assessed factors that influence the internal controls in 
ensuring good corporate governance in financial institutions in developing economies with 
special reference to Zimbabwe. The research paper assessed how lack of internal controls 
affected good corporate governance and aimed to bring out elements of good corporate 
governance. It emerged that failure to effectively implement internal controls contributed 
significantly to poor corporate governance. The study discovered that internal control system 
overrides and the issue of “fact cat” directors also contributed to poor corporate governance. 
The study recommended that there is need for the board of directors to guarantee an 
organizational structure that clearly defines management responsibilities, authority and 
reporting relationships. There is also need to ensure that delegated responsibilities are 
effectively carried out to ensure compliance with internal controls of the financial institution 
concerned. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The year period December 31 2003 to December 31 2004 witnessed the 
collapse of a number of financial institutions in Zimbabwe. This period witnessed a 
27.5% decline in the number of registered financial institutions from forty (40) to 
twenty nine (29). The impact of effective internal controls can thus not be 
overemphasized in ensuring good corporate governance practice and consequently 
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survival of financial institutions. The main cause of this crisis has been blamed on 
ineffective internal controls that would be used in measuring the compliance levels of 
managers in the day to day running of the financial institutions by the board. When one 
speaks of management it is essentially speaking of internal controls. Laxity of 
implementing effective internal controls, greedy and in some instances poor or lack of 
board supervision emerged as contributors to poor corporate governance in many 
financial institutions. 
  The study is set to clarify how ineffective internal controls contribute to lack of 
good corporate governance. The research defines internal controls and corporate 
governance structures and shows how the relationship can contribute towards improved 
operational procedures. Cartwright (1999) asserted that effective internal control is a 
tool that enhances good access to capital and ensures sustainability. Cartwright argued 
that effective internal controls also provide a moral compass that guides leaders and 
staff when faced with ethical dilemmas making it the foundation and building block 
upon which good corporate governance is built and sustained. He indicates that 
effective internal controls demand an oversight by senior management and board 
members, and this oversight should be accompanied by unquestionable commitment to 
the programme by the two leadership groups, with their behaviour being exemplary 
providing the ’tone at the top’. This is so because ethical behaviour of firm’s leaders 
has a strong impact on the ethical behaviour of its employees. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
  The paper thus strives to give answers to the following questions: 
-  How has internal control systems been effective in the Zimbabwean banking sector? 
-  How can efficient internal controls be implemented to promote corporate 
governance? 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
  A qualitative research design was used to assess internal controls in ensuring 
good corporate governance in financial institutions. Data was gathered through 
document review, questionnaires and structured interviews to clarify hanging issues in 
interviews. Targeted respondents included Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), managers 
from different levels from 8 commercial banks and 2 building societies. A total of ten 
(10) questionnaires and nine (9) interviews were used. The questionnaire had twelve 
(12) questions designed for the company secretaries, managers and CEOs from those 
banks so that they would not have any difficulty in responding to the questions. The 
questionnaire was divided into three (3) parts that is; part A which had two (2) 
questions constituting the respondent profile; part B with two (2) questions that formed 
the administrative section where the research was obtaining information about the 
financial institution and; finally part C formed the main body from which the crucial 
data for the research was obtained. Document review was also used to obtain much 
data as possible for a comprehensive, detailed and informed analysis of the study. The 
research is a study designed to explore the problems bedevilling the effectiveness of  
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internal controls in financial institutions and their consequence on the good corporate 
governance of these institutions. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  According to Harvey and Brown (1998), the major components of internal 
controls are control environment, accounting system and control procedures.  Smircich 
(1983) subscribes to the same sentiments by highlighting that the tone at the tog has 
implications on the direction taken by employees. Furthermore, Jansen (1998) pointed 
out that historically internal controls, has focused conforming employees’ actions to 
the desires of management. 
  An internal control system available to a firm according to Grieves (1998) 
consists of: management oversight and the control culture; risk recognition and 
assessment; control of activities and segregation of duties; information and 
communication and monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies. 
  Control environment reflects the overall attitude, awareness and actions of the 
board of directors, management and stockholders. The accounting system consists of 
the methods, records and report on entity’s transactions to provide complete, accurate 
and timely financial information. Finally the control procedures are essentially specific 
procedures put in place by management to provide assurance that the company’s 
objectives will be met. They usually come in the form of authorizations, segregation of 
duties, design and use of adequate documentation and records, adequate safeguards or 
access to assets and independent checks on performance. 
  The control environment reflects the overall attitude, awareness and actions of 
the BOD, management and stockholders. Borerwe (2004) consented to Deal and 
Kennedy (1982)’s views and defined corporate governance from the banking industry 
as a manner in which boards of directors govern the business affairs of individual 
institutions and senior management, affecting how the banks: 
-  run the day to day operations of the business; 
-  align corporate activities and behaviours with the expectation that banks will operate 
in safe and sound manner, compliance with laws and regulations; and 
-  set corporate objectives (including generating economic returns to shareholders and 
protect the depositor’s interests. 
  Robbins (1992) defines internal control systems as the whole  system of   
controls,  financial and otherwise, established by management in order to carry out the 
business of the enterprise in an orderly and efficient manner, ensure adherence to 
management, safeguard the assets and secure as far as possible the completeness  and 
accuracy of the records. According to Khan (1994), internal controls are designed to 
protect an institution from loss or misuse of its assets. They also ensure that all 
transactions are properly authorized and thus guarantee or foster good corporate 
governance. 
  Corporate governance has been defined as a manner in which the business of 
an enterprise is directed and controlled, how the corporate objectives are set and how 
corporate activities and expectations of the stakeholders are aligned (Coyle, 2003).  
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Corporate governance involves the combination of the body of directors, management 
and controls that guide the firm. 
  Borerwe (2004) reiterated that corporate governance is concerned with holding 
goals.  The aim is to align as near as possible the interest of individuals, corporate and 
society this can be ensured by having effective internal control system. Magaisa (2004) 
supported this view when he says that effective internal control is an attempt to 
encourage employees, managers, board members to think about and make decisions 
through the doctrine of shared values. 
  According to the King Report (2002) the corporate discipline, transparency, 
independency of board members and committees, fairness, accountability and social 
responsibility are the essential pillars of good corporate governance.  For a corporate to 
achieve good corporate governance it must adopt a clear stance on the following: 
Strategy, Stewardship, Corporate culture, Corporate reporting, IT systems and Board 
operations. Pheysey (1993) added another dimension to the above definition by 
defining corporate governance as the way business is conducted in accordance with the 
shareholders desire which generally is to make as much money as possible. 
  According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) a corporate governance 
guideline protect the integrity of the sector and cultivates confidence within investors 
and deposited, conditions that result in free circulation of funds thus making it easy for 
banks to undertake their day to day operations without difficulties. This entails 
economic development as a result of free circulation of money within the economy.  
Magaisa (2004) substantiated the RBZ governor’s statement by indicating that poorly 
governed financial institutions are a liability to the economy and are a functional 
equivalent of circulatory problem in human beings. 
  Harvey and Brown (1998) are of the view that the exclusive focus of corporate 
governance should maximize shareholder wealth to the extent that wealth 
maximization conflicts with the interests of other stake holder’s interests. Those 
interests should be ignored unless management is legally required to take interests into 
account.  Coyle (2003) added that the main corporate governance problem is rooted in 
the Blake and Mouton (1985) paradigm of separation of shareholders ownership and 
management’s control in institutions. This resulted in the emergence of the agency 
problem, which is the need of ensuring that management is always acting in the best 
interest of the shareholders rather than theirs (Davis and Militelo, 1994). 
  Buchanan (1975) views the firm as a system of stakeholders operating within a 
larger system of a host of society that provide necessary legal and market infrastructure 
for the firm’s activities. Khan (1994) supported this view by stating that the goal of 
directors and management should be maximizing total wealth creation by the firm. 
  RBZ (2004) recommended that boards of commercial banks and building 
societies must have at least five directors. The major reason for this recommendation 
was that large boards are for corporate performance because they have a range of 
expertise to help make quality decisions and makes it difficult for powerful CEOs to 
dominate. 
  Blake and Mouton (1985) indicated that monitoring by boards could deal with 
at least some problems of corporate governance. Johnson (1992) proposed that board 
of directors could solve agency problems if the company under performs in a health  
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industry because under this situation boards would find it easier to evaluate 
performance of the management. Weibach (1998) tested hypothesis  advanced by Fama 
(1980) and discovered that outside directors behave differently from inside directors 
and behave differently from inside  directors  and boards dominated by  outside 
directors performed better that  firms  with boards  dominated by insider directors to 
remove  the chief executive officer.  
  RBZ (2004) critique the concept of multiple appointments, the reason being 
directors who hold such appointments are ineffective in discharging their function to 
monitor managers. Magaisa (2004) concurred with this view and highlighted that 
members who sit on multiple boards do not have enough time to think of ways of 
improving the institutions in which they lead and it is very difficult for one to have the 
level of commitment that is necessary for effective governance to all companies it on 
board. King Report (2002) recommended high frequency of board meetings per 
annum. This suggests that meeting frequency is critical dimension of an effective 
board. French and Bell (1999) found that board meeting time is an important resource 
in improving the effectiveness of the board and most widely shared problem directors 
face is lack of time to carry out their duties. 
  Green (1997) suggested that the board and senior management of financial 
institutions are responsible of financial institutions are responsible for promoting high 
ethical and integrity standards and for establishing a culture within the organization 
that emphasis and demonstrated to all levels of personnel the importance of internal 
controls. Khan (1994) suggests that an effective internal control system requires that 
there are reliable information systems in place that cover all significant activities of 
that bank. The systems must be secured, monitored independently and support 
adequate contingency arrangements Deal and Kennedy (1982) argued that effective 
internal control systems requires effective communication. 
 
6. RESULTS  
 
  Responses were obtained from nine interviews and ten (10) questionnaires 
distributed to different banking institutions. Majority of respondents (92%) agreed that 
effective internal controls are an essential ingredient of good corporate governance. 
The remaining (8%) was of a different opinion saying corporate governance does not 
have any relationship with effective internal controls since some banks can outsource 
the services of control department.  
  The argument the respondents in the affirmative gave was that when the firm 
adopts sound and effective internal controls it avoids the risks of poor board oversight 
and issue of directors who sit on the board just to selfishly enrich themselves. 
  From the study, it also emerged that 80% of the banks have internal control 
departments, which typically includes internal audit, compliance officer, internal 
control unit, transaction authorization and verification. The other ones did not have 
such a department and relied on subcontracting services. In seven of the financial 
institutions investigated the function of the control unit  were identified as verifying 
compliance with regulators, ensuring competences and accuracy of financial  
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statements, implementing risk management policies, reviewing related party 
transaction and mitigation conflict of interest and separation of duties. 
  The research suggests that an internal control or internal audit department is an 
essential component which ensures good corporate governance. Therefore the audit 
committee is necessary to ensure that the banks assets are protected and that good 
corporate issues are respected. 
  On the importance of the key elements of good corporate governance the 
findings were that all respondents suggested transparency, principle of responsibility, 
fairness and discipline. However, the principle of social responsibility had 85% and 
that of independence was mentioned by 77% of the respondents. This conclusion 
alludes to the assertion that good corporate governance is a function of several factors 
or elements. 
  Asked on whether the banks had internal controls which aid in mitigating 
challenges associated with poor corporate governance all the respondents gave answers 
which can be classified broadly under the headlines of general and application control. 
Respondents indicated that general controls included staff loans policy, vacation 
policy, segregation of duties, lending control and physical control. It emerged that 
application controls are associated with computer packages. The findings  indicate that 
a greater proportion  of banks  have come to realize  the importance  of internal control 
in banks so as to ensure good corporate governance  in all operations of banks. 
  On answering the question on how Board of Directors BOD ensures that 
systems of internal control continue to operate effectively and efficiently in banks the 
following responses were obtained: 
  Risk management reviews are made 
  The board sets targets in place 
  The audit  committee has powers to  summon members to give evidence 
  Directors have access to the internal and external auditors  
  The board updates and reports from executives in meetings 
  Respondents revealed that the cause of corporate failures in Zimbabwe was 
due to one or more of the following factors: 
  Overriding internal controls 
  Fraud 
  Disregard of prudential  laws and regulations  
  Overtrading 
  Failure to have substantive  risk management team  
  Poor risk management practices 
  The results also revealed that lack of adequate safeguards and checks, 
insufficient segregation of duties/responsibilities and internal control deficiencies lead 
to poor corporate governance. Respondents also identified excessive pressure on 
management by senior management, few independent non executive directors and inter 
twined board settings as weaknesses that occur in banks in Zimbabwe. The weaknesses 
centre on the ineffectiveness of he boards in ensuring adequate controls to ensure good 
corporate governance. Results from respondents points out hat futile internal controls 
systems are the major cause of corporate failures in the Zimbabwean banking system.  
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  On the necessary components of an effective internal control system, 69% of 
the respondents identified the control environment, control activities, information 
communication, risk assessment and monitoring as the necessary components of an 
effective internal control system. Respondents indicated that control environment was 
the heart of effective control.  An analysis of the responses revealed that control 
activities should include approvals, verifications, reconciliations, and reviews of 
operating performance, security of assets and segregation of duties. 
  All the respondents concurred on the definition of internal controls by 
Minnesota State Auditor (2007) which defined internal controls as policies and 
procedures designed to protect an institution from loss or misuse of its assets and also 
to ensure that all transactions are properly authorized and thus guarantee or foster good 
corporate governance. In addition to the aforesaid the respondents also indicated that: 
  Poor capacity utilization 
  Liquidity Crunch 
  Poor capacity utilization 
  Lack of resources both human and capital 
  Poor data management 
  Disintegration of systems across departments 
  Stringent  regulatory  requirements could  affect effectiveness of their  internal 
control systems and hence corporate governance  in the future 
  Finally majority of the respondents indicated that although there were internal 
control systems in most banks their effectiveness was affected by poor supervision 
from the body of directors and the reasons for poor supervision by the body of 
directors ranged from multiple sitting on boards to what the respondents termed “fat 
cats” who set a the board for enriching themselves at he expense of monitoring 
performance of subordinates. This they resulted in poor corporate governance and 
subsequently poor performance of a bank indicating the positive correlation between 
effective internal controls and good corporate governance. 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
  According to the base committee on banking supervision, focus is increasingly 
on the importance of internal controls to ensure good corporate governance. This 
heightened interest in internal controls has in part a result of significant losses incurred 
by several banking organizations. An analysis of the problems related to these losses 
indicated there could probably have been avoided had the banks maintained effective 
internal control systems (Financial Stability Board, 1998). 
  Although most banks have effective internal controls, mediocrity of boards 
caused by selection on the basis of “olds boy club” rather than merit has seen these 
boards fail for supervise chief executive officers effectively. That is why RBZ turned 
down the proposal to appoint Mr D Simba as an executive director at its licensing stage 
due to his glaring lack of pre-requisite academic and professional qualifications as well 
as his questionable integrity. 
  Other factors such as lack of accountability due to there no being separation of 
ownership and control such as where an executive director is the majority shareholder.   
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This was the case before the collapse of the Barbican Bank when Dr Mtuli Ncube was 
the major share holder and chief executive officer. The chief executive officer 
dominated in the board meetings which resulted in the body of directors being a rubber 
stamping board. 
  In the United Kingdom in 1991, the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) collapsed due to fraud by top executives costing depositors and 
investors large sums of money amounting to 6 billion pounds nearly half the banks 
assets. In the 1970s in the US, during a period which more than 400 firms engaged in 
corrupt activities a commission called Tread Way or Committee of Sponsoring   
Organizations of the Tread Way Commission (COSO) was formed to deal specifically 
with financial reporting fraud. The first report was published in 1985. 
  Magaisa (2004) suggests that larger boards are less effective and easier for a 
chief executive officer to control because as boards become too large, it becomes 
difficult to coordinate and process problems. This was the case  with the body of 
directors of  Trust Bank  who said they were  unaware of the scenario were a 
significant amount of the banks loans were non performing and were granted without 
formal agreement facilities.  In his research Pheysey (1993) found a negative 
correlation between board and profitability of a firm. 
  Despite RBZ (2004) critique on multiple appointments Cook, who retired as 
chairman and chief executive officer of Deloitte and Touché in 1999 and sits on boards 
of five American companies, commented that there is considerable value being on 
multiple boards and the experience across boards can be of real value to governance 
(Cook, 2002). 
  As with all other areas of financial institutions activities, body of directors has 
a critical role to play in overseeing internal control functions of the bank. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) stipulates that the board should develop 
effective internal controls and adopt the necessary policies and procedures for 
conducing such. The internal should be approved and be reviewed periodically by the 
board. 
  In other instances top management wilfully violated internal controls as they 
tried to be creative and innovative in order to enhance shareholder interests of profit 
maximizing and in their desire to please the body of directors and be rewarded for 
good performance. In other occasions managers will not agree with internal controls 
and view them as stringent measures aimed to frustrating their endeavors. 
  In some case of banks such as Trust Bank of Zimbabwe, it was noted that 
though there were adequate internal control measures these were however principality 
reactive and non-proactive as these measures did not raise alarm to the board to take 
corrective action before the damage had been severe. Also in most instances, 
decoctions from such policies and procedures were not independently investigated and 
addressed by relevant parties.  In the case of Barbican Bank the body of directors tried 
to “sweep the mess under the carpet” pretending that everything was well until the 
RBZ surveillance time exposed the precarious situation in which the bank was 
operating under before it went on into liquidation. According to the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe majority of financial institutions have internal controls and if these internal 
controls were religiously adhered to good corporate governance would be the order of  
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the day in these financial institutions. However a number of factors discussed below 
have been militating against the soundly implementation of effective internal controls.  
  Borerwe (2004) saw economic confusion in the last decade in Zimbabwe, 
insatiable appetite for riches, corruption and double standards by senior management 
who preach good corporate governance during the day and do not walk their talk by 
awarding themselves heft packages which when it comes to the attention of workers 
would see management as insensitive and thus they will work towards evading internal 
controls so that they themselves will get rich. 
  There should be board oversight responsible for ensuring the following in 
financial institutions: 
-  Ensuring that senior management has not only developed but they have also 
implemented a properly structured internal control system. 
-  Periodic discussion with senior management concerning the effectiveness of the 
internal control system is held. 
-  Ensuring timely reviews of evaluations of internal controls are performed by internal 
and external auditors. 
-  Periodic checks to ensure that management has promptly acted on recommendations 
and concerns expressed by auditors and regulatory authorities   on internal control 
weakness. 
  For the internal controls to be effective they do not only need to be precise and 
well presented for everyone to know, but there also needs to be appointed compliance 
officers whose mandate is to oversee compliance issues. They should be equipped with 
necessary skills and expertise, the level of which should be commensurate with the 
complexity of the institutions activities. Cook (2002) suggested that the board and 
senior management of Banks are responsible for promoting high ethical and integrity 
standards and for establishing a culture within that organization that emphasizes and 
demonstrates to all levels of personnel the importance of internal controls.  All 
personnel at a bank need to understand their role in the internal controls systems and be 
fully engaged in the system. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The results obtained from the research clearly support the assertion that the 
effectiveness internal control systems contributed to a greater extent to good corporate 
governance in financial institutions in Zimbabwe. Therefore effective internal controls 
contribute to better performance by financial institutions. The success of the system 
depends on positive internal control culture. Banks should have in place a 
comprehensive internal control management process to identify, measure, monitor and 
control internal control system effectiveness and compliance. There is also need for 
financial institutions to cultivate a culture of ethically doing business from the top 
management which should see this culture cascading down to he most junior worker or 
employee in the organization so as to promote adherence to internal controls of the 
organization which are essentially management tools on measuring compliance to an 
organizations way of doing business in a competitive environment.  
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